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Households are dynamic while most surveys only collect information on individuals who are 
present at a single point in time. We exploit a unique and thorough household membership 
enumeration in Burkina Faso to consider the analytical costs of the typical static household 
roster. We document that households are extremely fluid with 10 percent of individuals 
spending sometime away over a three year period, averaging 16 of the 36 months away. The 
residency status of persons age 16 to 24 is most in flux. A more complete enumeration offers 
substantial analytical richness that is especially important for the analysis of issues that are 
intertwined with who is present in the household, such as the measurement of income 
inequality and the nature of sibling interactions in education decisions. We find that evidence 
of sibling rivalry in Burkina Faso appears to owe to the correlation between the presence of 
sisters in a household and nonagricultural income. We argue for more detailed and thorough 
measurement of household composition in future multi-purpose household surveys. 
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1. Introduction 
The conventional household roster of a multi-purpose household survey is an accounting of the 
individuals who are present at the time of sampling. The basis for this type of roster lies in the 
tradition of the census where the purpose of the survey was a full enumeration of a population 
present in a country at a specific point in time. However, a more complete enumeration of 
individuals associated with a household is potentially important when household membership is 
dynamic and responsive to the economic circumstances under study. 
This study asks the question of who we miss in a conventional household roster. 
Transitory migrants and departing children are the most likely to be affected by different 
restrictions on the roster, and there are large, related literatures on who migrants (de Brauw and 
Giles 2008, McKenzie 2008), when and why children depart (Rosenzweig and Stark 1989, Parish 
and Willis 1993), and the partitioning of households (Foster 1993, Foster and Rosenzweig 2002). 
Issues related to movements in and out of households are especially substantive in panel surveys, 
and there is a corresponding literature on attrition bias (Thomas, Frankenberg, and Smith 2001, 
Maluccio 2004, Baird, Hamory, Miguel 2008, Foster and Rosenzweig 2008).
1 We consider how 
the answer to the question of who we are missing in a conventional household roster influences 
the assessment of living standards and the analysis of the impact of household composition. 
The Burkina Faso Child Fostering Survey (BCFS), collected by Akresh in Bazega 
province in Burkina Faso, contains a novel household roster that we exploit to examine these 
issues. There are two principal methodological innovations in the BCFS household roster. First, 
the BCFS collects information on every biological child of the household head regardless of 
whether the child is currently resident at the time of the survey or not. Second, the survey 
collects information on all individuals (regardless of relationship to the head) who have lived 
                                                      
1 The distinction between household migration and individual migration is important to consider and emphasized in 
some studies of panel attrition. For example, de Laat (2005) focuses on migrant husbands in Kenya and their effort 
to monitor their rural spouses. Chen (2006) using data from China finds that for households with absentee migrant 
husbands, there are significant differences between child outcomes that are easily monitored and those that are not.   3
within the sampled household at any point during the previous three years.
2 This detailed roster 
information allows us to examine turnover within the household over time (both movements in 
and out) and to consider the implications of this turnover for research questions that are 
dependent on the assignment of individuals to a given household.  
Using these rich data, we document several points that have implications for economic 
analysis using household rosters. First, there is enough mobility in Burkina Faso that choices 
about how to define a household, especially about the appropriate period for membership, will 
have a substantive influence on analysis that is sensitive to household composition. This is 
especially true if the 16 to 24 age group is important for the analysis, as this group exhibits the 
highest mobility. Second, in and out movement is weakly correlated with household 
characteristics, so the economic analysis of household level issues will be less affected by 
mobility and limited rosters, except when those issues depend critically on who is present in the 
household. In contrast, individual characteristics such as gender, age, marital status, occupation, 
and education are strong predictors of mobility. Hence, investigations focusing on individual 
level variation or explaining individual attributes face particular difficulty with limited rosters. 
We highlight two research questions where the broader roster detail changes inference. 
First, while mobility is weakly correlated with household characteristics, it can be substantive for 
the measurement of household living standards and income inequality through adjustments for 
household composition (including corrections for economies of scale and adult equivalency). We 
document the measurement of inequality is affected by the way household membership is 
defined. This is especially important when household economies of scale are thought to be 
minimal since scale economies diminish the impact of small changes in household membership. 
                                                      
2 There were two reasons for selecting a three-year recall period. First, during extensive pre-testing of the survey 
instrument, households were able to reliably recall information about household membership, income, assets and 
transfers over a three-year time period, while the reliability and willingness to answer these questions about longer 
time periods was reduced. Second, this survey is part of a broader research program examining the impact of 
fostering on children’s welfare and involved locating and interviewing the sending and receiving household for each 
child fostering exchange that occurred during this three-year period. Based on the pre-testing, expanding the time 
period beyond three years would have created logistical difficulties in finding these linked foster households.   4
Second, the 16 to 24 age group is the most mobile. These young adults often have 
younger siblings that would be the subject of schooling studies. BCFS's more detailed household 
roster substantively alters findings about the nature of sibling rivalry. Using siblings present, we 
document strong support for the sibling rivalry hypothesis that children are made better off by 
having more female siblings because of their relatively lower return on investment. When we 
replace resident siblings with all siblings (taking advantage of the detailed data on children of the 
household head), we find little support for sibling rivalry. This difference between results using 
present siblings and all siblings owes to a correlation between having females present and non-
agricultural income. Higher non-agricultural income is associated with both keeping females at 
home and having children at home attend school. 
The next section describes the differences between the BCFS and a more conventional 
multi-purpose household roster. Section 3 documents the extent of mobility in the population 
under study and thus the sensitivity of economic analysis to decisions made about the roster and 
the household membership definition. Section 4 explores the impact of the more detailed 
household roster on the distribution of income analysis. Section 5 measures how inferences about 
sibling rivalry are impacted when using the more detailed roster. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Burkina Child Fostering Survey (BCFS) Household Roster 
These data were collected by Akresh in 2001 in the province of Bazega in central Burkina Faso. 
They have been used in a previous study of the determinants of child fostering (Akresh 2009) 
and of the schooling effects of child fostering (Akresh 2008). Bazega province is located 
approximately 50 miles from the Burkina Faso capital, Ouagadougou. The area is poor with an 
average annual household income of $158. The economy in Bazega is largely agricultural with 
sorghum and groundnuts the two principal crops. 
There were two phases of the BCFS. Phase 1 (BCFS-1) was a baseline survey and are the 
data analyzed in this paper. The survey consists of interviews with 606 randomly selected 
households in 15 randomly selected villages in Bazega province. BCFS-1 took place between   5
February 15, 2001 and April 12, 2001. The baseline survey collected the necessary information 
to locate the host family for any child who had been fostered out and to locate the biological 
parents for any child who had been fostered in. Phase 2 (BCFS-2) consisted of finding the paired 
households that exchanged a foster child and interviewing them using the same survey 
instrument as Phase 1. BCFS-2 was conducted between May 6, 2001 and August 30, 2001. 
Because of the non-random nature of the tracked household sample collected in the second 
phase, those Phase 2 surveys are not used in this paper’s analysis. 
Two aspects of the household roster in BCFS are unique and substantive in the current 
analysis. First, for every household, all survey questions in the household roster were asked 
about every biological child of the household head, regardless of whether the child was currently 
resident at the time of the survey or not. Second, for every household, all survey questions in the 
household roster were asked for any individual who had lived within the sampled household for 
at least four months at any point during the three years prior to the survey. These survey 
questions include the age, gender, marital status, occupation, educational attainment, school 
enrollment status during the three years prior to the survey (1998, 1999, and 2000), and the 
number of months that the individual lived outside of the village during 1998, 1999, and 2000. 
These two unique aspects (all biological children and anyone resident during the three 
years prior to the survey) of expanding the targets for the household roster differ from traditional, 
multipurpose household surveys in developing countries. Traditional household surveys will 
generally define membership in the household based on residency at the time of the survey. For 
example, the Demographic and Household Surveys define household membership as "persons 
who usually live in your household and guests ... who stayed here last night" (ICF Macro 2010, 
pp. HH-4). There is variation across surveys on how long the individual must have been resident, 
with durations ranging from one day to several months. The Indonesian Family Life Survey 
defines a household member as, “anyone who usually lives in the household, whether she/he is at 
home during the survey or is temporarily absent. A householder who has been away for 6 or   6
more months, and a householder who has been away for less than 6 months but plans to move 
out/be away for 6 or more months is not regarded as a householder.” 
However, these official definitions to determine household membership are often more 
ambiguous and fluid when the survey is in the field. The Burkina Faso ICRISAT (International 
Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics) data collected from 1981 to 1985 is an 
example of how on-the-ground realities impacted defining household membership. Matlon 
(1988) in the ICRISAT data manual describes the issue: 
“An entirely unambiguous, consistent, and universal definition of the ‘household’ for 
use in sampling, data collection, and analysis, proved to be elusive. This is due to: 
1)  strong underlying social and economic ties which link even apparently 
independent production/consumption units 
2)  the fragmentation of intra-unit decision-making by type of economic activity 
(e.g. production vs. consumption; agricultural vs. non-agricultural production; 
individual vs. communal or ‘household’ farming) 
3)  changes in the loci of decision-making and in group structures across seasons 
(in part as a function of seasonal flux in economic activities).” 
It is clear that determining which individuals are members of a given surveyed household is 
complex and incorporates decisions about production, consumption, and residency. Recent 
research in Tanzania by Leone, Coast, and Randal (2009) used in-depth case study interviews to 
explore how household membership as defined by survey practitioners differed from the social 
units that people themselves defined as the relevant household. Household age and sex structure 
changed significantly across these definitions. Beaman and Dillon (2009) in Mali randomized 
four different household definitions (varying production and consumption membership 
restrictions) that resulted in changes in measures of household composition, particularly the 
number of male household members. One key difference in our paper is that we have the entire 
universe of ever born biological children of the household head and we are able to then explore 
how residency of these individuals interacts with substantive research questions. 
3. How Much Information is Gained With the More Detailed Roster? 
The obvious first question in discussing the additional roster detail collected in the BCFS is 
whether it nets additional information. If households are stagnant and household members   7
infrequently move, then the expanded BCFS roster structure will yield little analytical gain while 
contributing to additional fieldwork complications. In our context of rural Burkina Faso, there 
appears to be a great deal of movement in and out of households. 
We first plot the distribution of move-out rates for BCFS households. For each household 
present at the time of sampling in early 2001, the roster provides information about any 
individual present in 1998, 1999, or 2000. We compute if individuals present in 1998 were still 
present at any point in the final reference year, 2000. An individual is viewed as moving out if 
they were present at some point in 1998 and not present at any point in 2000. The household's 
move-out rate is the fraction of individuals present at some point in 1998 but not in 2000. The 
distribution of move-out rates across the 606 sampled households is in Figure 1. 
Most individuals do not move between 1998 and 2000. Of those present at some point in 
1998, 94 percent are present at some point in 2000.
3 However, movers are spread over many 
households so that 41 percent of households experience some out movement between 1998 and 
2000. This is evident in Figure 1 as the mass to the right of zero. At the household level, the 
move-out rate distribution ranges from 0 to 2/3 of household members present in 1998 not 
present in 2000. For households that experience departure, the modal move-out rate is 12.5 
percent of 1998 members. Figure 1 and these calculations explicitly do not include deaths. If 
deaths are included, then 61 percent of households experience changes in the population that is 
still present in 2000. 
An alternative measure of mobility is to look at the rate of new entrants. Figure 1 treats 
the 1998 (first period) population as the reference group and examines how many leave. To 
examine new entrants, we treat the 2000 (last period) population as the reference group and 
                                                      
3 The move-out rate from 1999 to 2000 is just over three percent. If this one-year and two-year move-out rate 
remained constant over a ten-year time period, then conducting a panel survey on this population would indicate that 
roughly 30 to 35 percent of individuals present in the baseline survey would no longer be living in the village at the 
time of a follow-up panel. Tracking these movers as was done in Kagera (Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon 2008) 
would be critical for preventing biased analyses. In addition, this six percent overall move-out rate masks the much 
higher move-out rate of 23 percent for those individuals aged 16 to 24.   8
examine how many people present in 2000 are new entrants to the household over the two 
previous years. The distribution of new entrant rates is pictured in Figure 2. Births are not 
included in the figure. 
Most individuals present in 2000 are not new entrants. Of those present in 2000, 93 
percent were present two years earlier.
4 At the household level, 35 percent of households 
experience some new entry other than births during the previous two years, and the range of the 
fraction of household members that are new entrants is 0 to 100 percent. A household that exists 
in 2000 but did not exist in 1998 would have 100 percent of its members as new entrants and 
would be missed entirely in Figure 1. The distribution of new entry rates across households is 
substantively more concentrated around zero than is the out movement rate. Fewer than 10 
percent of households have had more than 20 percent of their members arrive within the last two 
years. When births are considered as new entrants, we observe substantively greater rates of new 
entry as fertility is high in the study area. When births are included, 25 percent of those present 
in 2000 are new entrants and 89 percent of households experience new entrants. 
These two different mobility measures in Figures 1 and 2 are coarse in that many 
individuals can be both absent and present in a given year. To gauge how much time someone 
spends away from home, we calculate the fraction of the previous 36 months an individual on the 
roster lived outside of the village.
5 The distribution of the share of time spent outside the village 
is shown in Figure 3. As in the previous figures, births and deaths are excluded. 
Seventy-seven percent of individuals spent all 36 months present in the village. Thus, 
nearly 1/4 of individuals spend some time living outside their village. This contrasts with 94 
percent of those present in 1998 were present in 2000, and 93 percent of those present in 2000 
were present in 1998. It is obvious that a sizeable portion of the population spends some time 
                                                      
4 For those individuals aged 16 to 24, 15 percent of those present in 2000 were not present two years earlier. 
5 The roster also collects information on all children of the household head, some of whom may not have been 
present. Hence, we tabulate the fraction of the last 36 months an individual was present only for individuals present 
at some point.   9
away, while returning for parts of the year. On average, individuals spent about 10 percent of the 
three-year period living away from home. For those individuals who spent a non-zero amount of 
time living outside the village, they spent on average 16 of the 36 months away. This group may 
easily be missed by conventional rosters. The relatively small overall share of total time spent 
away for this group suggests that they may appropriately be considered a part of the household. 
Hence, their exclusion is potentially a substantive cause for concern in the economic analysis of 
data using conventional household rosters. 
Since most individuals do not move but a large number of households experience some 
movement, this implies the correlation between household attributes and out migration will be 
weak. That is, the distribution of movers will be spread across households. In fact, 74 percent of 
the variation in the share of the last 36 months spent away is within household and only 26 
percent is between households. Household characteristics will be weak predictors of mobility. 
We therefore focus our discussion on the correlates of mobility foremost on individual attributes. 
A more detailed examination of the frequency of mobility will help identify where 
household membership decisions are most likely to impact analysis. Table 1 tabulates by age and 
gender the distribution of the share of the last 36 months spent outside the village.
6 It is already 
known that young adults are the most likely population to migrate. Table 1 supports this in that 
the 16 to 24 age group are those most likely to have left their residence in the previous 36 
months. A majority of this age group spent some time away. The distribution of time away for 
this 16 to 24 age group looks fairly flat across the possible distribution of time away. Older 
adults (ages 25 to 49) and school age children (ages 8 to 15) are also more likely to spend time 
away than the oldest and youngest age groups, but their time away is more concentrated in a 
relatively brief period (under 6 months) when contrasted with the 16 to 24 age group. 
                                                      
6 There are 109 missing values for age for individuals that were alive and present at some point between 1998 and 
2000. They are included in Figures 1 to 3, but are excluded from Table 1.   10
Panels B and C in Table 1 present a tabulation by age of time spent outside the village for 
males and females. It is striking that the distribution of time away and the frequency of time 
away looks similar for both genders in the 16 to 24 age group. It is substantively different for 
older age groups, especially ages 25 to 49, where women are far more likely to have been present 
for all 36 months, whereas men ages 25 to 49 are more likely to be away for 1 to 12 months. 
The significant individual mobility documented in Table 1 has clear implications for a 
number of household characteristics. In particular, measures of household size will vary based on 
whether individuals who are temporarily living outside of the village are included as members of 
the household. In Table 2, we document the magnitude of the changes in household size, 
dependency ratios, and household per capita income using alternative residence requirements for 
inclusion in the household. Column 1 is the most restrictive, indicating an individual is 
considered a member only if they have never lived outside the village during the previous three 
years. Column 6 presents the most inclusive definition, which treats any individual that has been 
resident in the household at any point during the previous three years as a member. Columns 2 to 
5 present intermediate definitions based on the number of months a person lived outside the 
village. Household size varies from 5.8 to 7.5 members, a 29 percent increase due to expanding 
the residency restrictions on membership. Consistent with Table 1, the largest change in 
household size is due to adding individuals aged 16 to 24, and moving from column 1 to 6 
represents more than a doubling in members of this age group for both males and females. 
Related to changes in household size are the subsequent changes in dependency ratios. 
We calculate a total dependency ratio as the number of children age 0 to 15 plus the number of 
adults over age 65 divided by the number of individuals age 16 to 64 multiplied by 100. 
Dependency ratios are quite high in rural Africa, partly due to high fertility, and we find ratios 
between 134 and 155 depending on which individuals are considered members of the household. 
Moving from the most exclusive definition in column 1 to the most inclusive and given the large 
movement of adults age 16 to 24, the dependency ratio drops about 11 percent as additional   11
individuals are considered included in the household. Total household per capita income, per 
capita agricultural income, and per capita non-agricultural income drops by 24 to 30 percent as 
we move from the most exclusive household membership definition to the most inclusive. 
The share of the previous 36 months away is only one of many possible measures of 
mobility and it confounds those who exit, with those who enter, and those who are intermittently 
away. We can separate out these different concepts of mobility with the detailed roster in the 
BCFS. In Table 3a, we examine for all individuals the correlation between individual attributes 
and these different mobility concepts. Each column in Table 3a reflects a different dependent 
variable: an indicator for whether an individual has lived outside of the sampled village, an 
indicator that an individual moves out during the 36 months of reference and does not return, an 
indicator that an individual moves out and returns, and the fraction of the 36 month period spent 
away. We employ linear regression to compute conditional means of the relationship between 
individual characteristics and the mobility concept. These conditional means in Table 3 are not 
causal relationships. Of course, this simple cross-tabulation of correlation between migration and 
individual characteristics can mask important interactions (McKenzie and Rapoport 2007b). 
Young adults 16 to 24 are more likely to live outside of the village, are more likely to 
move out and not return, and spend a larger share of the last 36 months away. Thus, some of the 
mobility of young adults may reflect children growing up and establishing independent lives, 
although the difference in mobility for young adults persists even controlling for marital status 
and education in Table 3a. However, young adults are also more likely to move out for a 
temporary period and return (column 3) than any other age group. 
In general, the correlates of moving outside the village (column 1 of Table 3a) and the 
fraction of the 36 months spent away (column 4 of Table 3a) are similar. Individuals involved in 
non-agricultural occupations are more likely to move and spend more time away. The widowed, 
divorced, and never married individuals are less likely to move. In contrast to biological children   12
of the household head (the reference population), wives and heads of households are less likely 
to migrate while other relations are more likely to migrate. 
Comparing individuals who move out and do not return to individuals who move out and 
return (columns 2 and 3) is informative of what attributes are associated with permanent versus 
temporary migration. Of course, moving out and not returning (column 2) is a poor proxy for 
permanent migration as we are limited in information, and some of those who left without 
returning during the last 36 months will return in the future. Nonetheless, compared to the 
married group, those who have never married are less likely to move out and never return and 
more likely to move out and return. Compared to biological children of the household head, 
wives are more likely to leave and return as are other relations. The more educated are also more 
likely to move out and return and are less likely to move out without returning. This might reflect 
that some of the movement in this high education group is for schooling as secondary school 
access is far from universal in our study population. 
Men are less likely to migrate than women given their other characteristics in Table 3. 
We observed a similar pattern in Table 1 (without regression controls), and in Table 1 it 
appeared to be driven by young girls spending more time away than boys. This may reflect the 
types of activities girls are involved in, their greater involvement in domestic work, and their 
lower rates of school enrollment. In Table 3b we reproduce the conditional means of Table 3a 
bifurcating the sample by gender. The most noticeable differences are that males age 25 to 49 
appear to have similar migration probabilities as those aged 16 to 24, whereas older women have 
lower probabilities of living outside of the village than young adult women. Never married 
women are much less likely to live outside of the village compared to never married men. 
Finally, females with secondary or higher education are much more likely to live outside of the 
village while education does not appear highly correlated with male migration. 
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4. Measuring Inequality 
Most measures of economic well-being are calculated using household level data. There are three 
substantive issues in how the assignment of individuals to households influences measurement of 
the standard of living and the distribution of income. First, when an individual is an earner, his 
presence or exclusion from a household will influence the total income and expenditures for the 
household. Second, most welfare measures adjust the computed income or expenditure measure 
for the number of individuals that share in that income or expenditure. Third, there may be 
economies of scale in the household that cause living standards measurement to vary based on 
how individuals are assigned to households, even in the case where the distribution of income is 
uniform across individuals (which mitigates the import of the first two issues). Hence, the ways 
in which a roster assigns individuals to households will have substantive implications for welfare 
calculations and inequality measurement. 
Computing a welfare measure includes assumptions about household economies of scale 
and the relative consumption needs of different demographic groups. Deaton and Paxson (1998) 
review this literature and the importance of different assumptions in the computation of adult 
equivalence. We define an adult equivalent as,  () EAK
θ β =+ , where A is the number of 
adults assigned to the household, K is the number of children, β adjusts for the fact children may 
have reduced consumption needs compared to adults. θ is the economy of scale parameter.
7 
Assumptions about economies of scale can be important in the measurement of the 
distribution of income and tracking welfare. They have received an enormous amount of study 
(see Logan (2008) for estimates of changes in economies of scale in U.S. history). The larger the 
economy of scale, the less substantive is how individuals are assigned to households in our study 
setting. If we had a large scale national survey, then economies of scale could be more 
                                                      
7 Often adult equivalence calculations treat one-adult and multiple-adult households differently to allow for fixed 
start-up costs. With an average household size between 5.8 and 7.5 depending on how individuals are assigned to 
households, the addition or subtraction of individuals from households based on different membership rules will not 
move many households between one and two members. Thus, we ignore this adjustment in our discussion.   14
substantive if we were shifting individuals from single person to large households with varying 
assumptions on how to define the household, but sampling is in one area of Burkina Faso. There 
is little risk we are observing the same migrant in multiple sampled households. Given the high 
mobility of the 16 to 24 age group (51 percent of these individuals spent some time outside of the 
village during 1998 to 2000), the important margin for differences in household composition 
based on how a household is defined will be in a population that is usually not considered in K. 
Hence, issues associated with β are potentially smaller, but there is still significant mobility 
among children (22 percent of children age 8 to 15 spent some time during the three year period 
outside of the village), and we consider the distribution of income for β = 1 and β = 0.5. 
Our discussion of the impact of household composition on the measurement of living 
standards is driven by variation in counts of the number of individuals present, even though it is 
plausible that household income varies with how individuals are assigned to the household. 
While the BCFS instrument collects atypical detail in the roster, it is difficult to assign income 
directly to individuals in the context of our study area, and the instrument is not designed to 
capture consumption-based measures of well-being. Thus, the survey limits our discussion to 
treating income as fixed for an individual household, and we focus on agricultural income, 
specifically because it cannot be easily assigned to one individual earner in our data. We define 









, where Income measures 
total household agricultural income. 
To illustrate the importance of assumptions about when an individual is classified as a 
household member, we focus on the most dramatic juxtaposition. We compare the case where 
adult equivalence is computed by restricting the household to individuals who are present for all 
12 months of 2000 to the case where the household is defined as individuals who are present for 
any of 2000. Neither extreme is likely to be implemented in practice in household surveys, but 
by considering these bounds, it is easier to see that these assumptions about when an individual   15
is considered a member of the household have substance. We refer to the household population 
that has been present for all 12 months of 2000 as the exclusive population. We refer to the 
household population that has been present at any point in 2000 as the inclusive population. 
We compare the distribution of income between the exclusive and inclusive populations 
by plotting the respective Lorenz curves. Figure 4 contains the Lorenz curves for the exclusive 
and inclusive populations when a child is treated as equivalent to an adult (β = 1). Figure 5 
contains the Lorenz curves when a child is treated as half an adult (β = 0.5). This parameter 
range is chosen to represent the extremes in the literature on adult equivalence (Deaton 1997). 
The most inclusive definition of the household's population implies less inequality than 
the exclusive definition. This is visible in both Figures 4 and 5 as the Lorenz curve for the 
inclusive population is everywhere to the interior of the exclusive population curve. Based on 
Figure 4, the corresponding Gini coefficient for the exclusive population is 0.557 and for the 
inclusive population is 0.519. Differences between the Lorenz curves for the two household 
definitions are not visible in the poorest 40 percent of the population, but it is the middle of the 
distribution where the differences becomes more apparent. One possible explanation for this is 
that the distribution of agricultural income is not strongly correlated with total household size 
(this comes up again in Table 5 below). Hence, many of the households measured as poorest 
have more members. The marginal effect on income per adult equivalent of assigning an 
additional individual to the household in a large family is less than in a small family. 
Differences in Lorenz curves between inclusive and exclusive household definitions are 
more apparent when children are counted as less than adults. This is evident in Figure 5 that 
treats a child as 0.5 adults for welfare calculation purposes. Compared to Figure 4, the difference 
between the exclusive and inclusive Lorenz curves are slightly larger and the corresponding Gini 
coefficients are 0.565 and 0.518, respectively. The difference between the two curves is also 
measureable in a poorer and smaller segment of the population. We think this is because β = 0.5   16
reduces average household size, and therefore the marginal effect of adding a person to the 
household on income per adult equivalent is larger in Figure 5 than when β = 1 in Figure 4. 
While there are measureable differences in inequality depending on how individuals are 
assigned to households, greater economies of scale attenuate the importance of how individuals 
are assigned to households. This is a mechanical point. The marginal effect on income per adult 








. Smaller θ  implies 
greater economies of scale and a smaller effect on income per adult equivalent of changing the 
number of adults. This is apparent in Figure 6. Figure 6 mimics Figures 4 and 5 in construction 
but with the economies of scale assumption that θ=0.5. θ=0.5 is the upper bound on the possible 
economies of scale considered in Deaton and Paxson (1998). Differences in the Lorenz curves 
between the exclusive and inclusive household definitions are barely observable in Figure 6. 
The challenge with this discussion is that the BCFS allows us to illustrate that measures 
of inequality will be influenced by how individuals are assigned to households, but it does not 
provide us with a clear answer to what the ‘true’ response is to the question of who belongs in 
the household. One possible approach when income measurement is the focus is to also collect 
information to identify which of the family members are involved in the production of that 
income, but we cannot identify this in the BCFS survey. Also, the observation that a more 
inclusive household definition reduces inequality is, of course, only one aspect of how migrants 
influence inequality. While their assignment to households has an impact on measured welfare, 
migration itself has welfare consequence that may be welfare improving (de Brauw and Harigaya 
2007) and inequality reducing (McKenzie and Rapoport's 2007a). Nonetheless, the illustration in 
this section shows how substantive household definitions can be in measuring welfare, especially 
in cases where there are limited economies of scale. 
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5. Sibling Rivalry 
Most economic models of the household have the implication that household decisions depend 
on who is present. There are many reasons for a connection between household composition and 
household decisions ranging from the household decision-making process to shadow prices and 
budget constraints. Any empirical study of the interaction of household composition and 
outcomes of household decisions can be influenced by how composition is measured. 
We focus on sibling interactions and sibling rivalry in particular. Sibling interactions are 
an obvious topic choice to examine, because many of the young adults who appear most mobile 
and transitory in our data have siblings in the household.  
A number of studies have examined the interaction of siblings in order to understand why 
girls often receive less education than their brothers. Butcher and Case (1994) is an important 
example. They use data from the United States that contains explicit information an individual’s 
completed education and about their brothers and sisters. They emphasize three explanations for 
why sibling sex composition might influence education decisions: resource competition between 
siblings, sex-typing of tasks, and peer effects. Resource competition occurs if boys and girls have 
different relative prices for investments in education or returns to that investment. Sex-typing 
stems from parents sending messages to children describing appropriate behaviors and goals, 
while peer effects come from children developing traits that depend on how they interact with 
their siblings. Butcher and Case find that women with only brothers receive significantly more 
education on average than women with any sisters. 
The Butcher and Case finding is different than typically found in low income country 
studies. Parish and Willis (1993) examine how sibling sex composition influences the education 
of girls in Taiwan. They emphasize that cultural traditions favoring male descent can cause 
parents to manipulate daughters for the benefit of their sons. Garg and Morduch (1997) show that 
observationally similar behaviors can follow in a model where parents are altruistic to all their 
children. Instead, Garg and Morduch emphasize sibling rivalry. Credit constrained households   18
have their decisions about their children’s education influenced by both the number of children 
they have, resource dilution, and the sex composition of their children, sibling rivalry. Resource 
dilution occurs because more children imply fewer resources per child and credit constraints 
limit the family's ability to borrow against future returns. Sibling rivalry occurs because all 
children benefit from having fewer siblings with comparatively higher returns on investment. 
Many studies document resource dilution and sibling rivalry in educational investments 
in poor countries. In addition to the Ghana and Taiwan studies (Garg and Morduch 1997, Parish 
and Willis 1993), the list includes: Binder (1998) for Mexico, Morduch (2000) for Tanzania, 
Edmonds (2007) for Nepal, Ota and Moffatt (2007) for India, and Dammert (2010) for 
Guatemala and Nicaragua. While the emphasis on the sibling rivalry cause in Garg and Morduch 
is credit constraints and differences in relative returns to education, Edmonds (2007) emphasizes 
that comparative advantage in home production can lead to similar implications when girls have 
comparative advantage and it is not possible to hire labor for home production. Both Edmonds 
(2007) and Dammert (2010) find evidence consistent with this sibling rivalry interpretation. 
Studies of sibling rivalry in education typically regress a measure of schooling 
(attendance, enrollment, attainment) on counts of the number of siblings a child has and counts 
of the number of sisters a child has. That is: 
 (1) 
010 1 ih i h i i ih eX Z S F α α ββε = ++++  
where eih is the educational outcome for child i in household h, Xi is a vector of individual 
characteristics, Zh is a vector of household characteristics, Si is a count of the number of siblings 
the child has, and Fi is a count of the number of female siblings the child has. The interpretation 
of β0 is the change in eih associated with an additional male sibling. The interpretation of β1 is the 
change in eih associated with the thought experiment of converting a sibling from a male to a 
female. β0 + β1 is then the change in eih associated with adding an additional female sibling. 
Conventional household rosters create two problems for researchers. First, it is difficult to 
identify siblings in settings where extended family members are present. Rosters typically define   19
relationships relative to the household head. Hence, a study must choose between analyzing the 
correlation between education and household membership or the correlation between education 
and siblings only for children of the household head. Restricting the study to children of the 
household head is typical in the relevant literature and is what is done in this paper. Second, it is 
not possible to accurately identify sibling counts when all siblings of the household head do not 
meet the criteria for being included in the household. This might just introduce classical 
measurement error if errors in counting siblings are random, but that seems unlikely. We already 
observed a correlation between non-agricultural occupations and migration in our discussion of 
Table 3a. We expect the measurement error in the number of siblings to be correlated with other 
factors including the siblings’ age, the activities available to siblings (and thereby gender, local 
labor market conditions, and migration opportunities), wealth, and preferences. 
The BCFS roster collects detailed information for all ever born children of the household 
head regardless of their residence status. Hence, our analysis is restricted to children of the 
household head as well, but we are able to gauge how important missing, non-resident siblings 
are for the study of sibling rivalry. Of course one source of difficulty in interpretation that is 
common to all studies of sibling interactions is the endogenous nature of fertility decisions. This 
problem plagues all studies of sibling rivalry and the present study is no exception. 
There appears to be sibling rivalry in Burkina Faso when we estimate a conventional 
sibling rivalry regression as in equation 1 that is based on resident children of the household 
head only. This finding is documented in Table 4. In the first column, we regress whether a child 
age 8 to 15 of the household head attends school on the number of resident siblings and the 
number of resident sisters as well as dummy variables for child age and gender. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the village level because of survey design. Each additional male sibling 
reduces the probability the child attends school by 2 percentage points or 8 percent (26 percent of 
children are enrolled in school). This is the resource dilution effect. Each additional female 
sibling has no impact on whether the child attends school. Hence the thought experiment of   20
switching a sibling's gender from boy to girl raises schooling by 2 percentage points. This is 
sibling rivalry. Column 2 adds village fixed effects to our regressions and results appear similar.
8 
Resource dilution and sibling rivalry effects only appear substantive for boys. Focusing 
on the village fixed effects specification in column 2 of the table, an additional boy lowers 
schooling for boys by 3 percentage points or 10 percent (30 percent of boys aged 8 to 15 are 
enrolled in school). The sibling rivalry thought experiment of converting a sibling from boy to 
girl is associated with school enrollment that is higher by 4 percentage points. Girls have lower 
school enrollment overall. Twenty-one percent of girls aged 8 to 15 attend school, and their 
schooling appears unrelated to the number of siblings or number of sisters in the household. We 
focus our remaining discussion on boys and the related results in Panel B. 
When we look at the relationship between schooling and the number of actual siblings as 
opposed to co-resident siblings, we do not observe sibling rivalry. This is evident in columns 3 to 
6 of Table 4. Counting the number of siblings, not just resident or living siblings, is feasible with 
the detailed BCFS household roster. Columns 3 and 4 use all siblings, including deceased ones, 
in calculating the sibling counts, while columns 5 and 6 only use living siblings to calculate the 
sibling count variables. For the regressions in these columns, the count of number of siblings and 
number of sisters is not restricted to siblings that are in residence in the surveyed household. 
While results are similar across the two sets of columns, we focus our discussion on columns 5 
and 6, where only living children are included in the sibling counts.
9 In the specification for boys 
without village fixed effects (column 5), the sibling rivalry coefficient is reduced by a factor of 
10 compared to the baseline results in column 1. With village fixed effects (column 6), the 
sibling rivalry coefficient is reduced by 65 percent. 
                                                      
8 The advantage of village fixed effects is that they control for village characteristics that are apt to be correlated 
with school enrollment and household composition. The problem with including village effects is that some of these 
village characteristics are useful sources of variation in the presence of siblings and schooling choices. 
9 A case can be made for including deceased children in sibling counts. There are a substantive number of deaths, 
with 20 percent of the household head’s ever born children deceased at the time of enumeration. We focus our 
discussion on living siblings because we think the choice of current school enrollment is more likely to depend on 
current credit constraints or contemporaneous comparative advantage of siblings.    21
One possible reason for the disappearance of measurable sibling rivalry when all siblings 
are included is that it is not unusual to see a large age span across siblings in a household due to 
polygamy and re-marriage. Adding children from another time period might simply add 
measurement error to the measure of siblings and female siblings. This does not appear to be the 
case. In columns 7 and 8, we restrict sibling counts to siblings under the age of 25. Compared 
with the resident sibling specification (columns 1 and 2), counts of siblings under 25 provide 
much weaker evidence of sibling rivalry in the data although slightly larger than the associations 
observed in columns 5 and 6. 
Another possible explanation for the difference between estimates of sibling rivalry with 
all siblings and all resident siblings is that residency is correlated with latent factors that will also 
be associated with schooling. Edmonds, Mammen, and Miller (2005) show that in South Africa 
non-labor income is associated with more young women present in the household. Obviously the 
South African study setting differs from ours in innumerable ways, but if higher incomes allow 
families to keep their girls at home, then we might observe a correlation between the presence of 
females and schooling that reflects the impact of income on each rather than sibling rivalry. 
Two pieces of evidence suggest scope for the correlation between female residence and 
other factors that are also correlates of education. First, there is clearly selection in the gender 
mix that is present at any point in time. In Table 4, there are 1.08 male children of the household 
head aged 8 to 15 present for every girl in the same age range. However, there are 0.99 living 
male children 8 to 15 of the household head for every living female. Second, non-agricultural 
income also appears to be correlated with the presence of young women in the Burkina data. 
Non-agricultural income is positively correlated with the probability that a biological 
sister is present. This is evident in Table 5. Table 5 reports the results of regressing the number 
of female siblings present in the household on non-agricultural income, the number of female 
siblings that are alive, and the number of biological siblings present. Columns 1 and 2 are 
estimated on the full sample. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to boys. A causal model is not   22
being estimated. We are seeing if the data suggest a positive correlation between income and the 
presence of females.  Of course, there may be strong theoretical reasons to expect a non-linear 
relationship between income and the presence of females or migration (see McKenzie and 
Rapoport 2007a), but our sample sizes are sufficiently small that we do not feel that we can 
identify higher order relationships. Our focus on non-agricultural income is driven by the 
correlation between migration and non-agricultural occupations documented in Table 3.
10 
Columns 2 and 4 include village fixed effects; columns 1 and 3 do not. Because we control for 
the number of living female siblings and the number of living biological siblings, the 
interpretation of the coefficient on non-agricultural income is how the income measure increases 
the number of living females that appear in the household.
11  
We observe a positive association between the presence of sisters and non-agricultural 
income. Non-agricultural income is associated with fewer living female siblings (not shown), but 
a higher share of those living who are present. This appears valid in the full sample and when we 
focus on the presence of sisters of boys who are resident (last 2 columns). This evidence is 
consistent with studies that document a link between migration and non-farm enterprise 
operation and productivity (Dustmann and Kirkchamp 2002, Woodruff and Zenteno 2007), but 
of course there is also the possibility of a link between farms and the presence of children (Foster 
and Rosenzweig 2008 is a review). On this point, it is worth noting our analysis treats fertility as 
exogenous, but there are good reasons to think there exists a connection between latent labor 
demand and fertility (Rosenzweig 1977, Rosenzweig and Evenson 1977). 
These findings imply that controlling for non-agricultural income should attenuate the 
correlation between sibling rivalry and schooling when sibling rivalry is identified based on 
resident siblings only. This is apparent in Table 6 when we control for non-agricultural income. 
                                                      
10 In unreported regressions, we also controlled for agricultural income and the value of assets. They do not appear 
to substantively influence the magnitude of the coefficient on non-agriculture income and do not have significant 
nor substantive predictive power themselves. 
11 The number of observations decreases between Tables 4 and 5, because of missing income data for some 
households, although the regression results in Table 4 are qualitatively similar using the decreased sample size in 
Table 5.   23
Table 6 is comparable to columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, which run a regression of schooling on the 
number of co-resident siblings and the number of co-resident sisters.
12 In column 2 with village 
fixed effects, controlling for non-agricultural income reduces the coefficient on number of 
resident sisters by 35 percent. For the boys only sample with village fixed effects (column 4), 
controlling for non-agricultural income reduces the coefficient on number of sisters by 21 
percent. Controlling for non-agricultural income does not reduce the sibling rivalry effects for 
resident sisters by the same magnitude as replacing resident sisters with actual sisters. Thus, the 
underlying selection process that leads there to be a positive correlation between sister co-
residency and education is more complicated than just non-agricultural income.  
It is obvious that our design does not speak to the causal mechanisms behind this 
correlation between sibling selection and education. Other studies have attempted to separate the 
impact of migration on the left behind household from the correlates of selection into migration 
(de Brauw and Giles 2008, Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 2009). Overall, there appears ample 
reason to conclude that the types of sibling information collected in conventional rosters can be 
misleading when used to study sibling interactions. We find little evidence that supports the 
sibling rivalry hypothesis when we take advantage of the additional information on non-resident 
siblings collected in the BCFS. 
6. Conclusion 
Most multi-purpose household survey rosters are restricted to collecting data on individuals who 
are present in a narrow window of time. This approach to measuring household membership has 
an important advantage in that it minimizes the extent to which individuals are double counted in 
the survey. This produces more precise national statistics. However, this snapshot approach to 
the household roster has substantive analytical costs which have been documented herein. 
                                                      
12 The sample size in Table 6 is reduced compared to Table 4 because of missing income data as in Table 5. We find 
reduced estimates of the extent of sibling rivalry when we control for income, and this reduction does not owe to the 
different sample size as estimates in the reduced sample are similar in magnitude to those reported for the full 
sample in Table 4.   24
Young adults are the most mobile population in our study area. Persons 16 to 24 spend 
more time out of their village than persons of other ages. They are more likely to leave their 
village and not return, and they are more likely to leave their village and return to it than other 
age groups. Young adults not only leave to form their own households, but they also are more 
likely to leave their family temporarily. This means that young adults are most apt to be missed 
in rosters with narrow time windows, and they are the group most likely to be affected by 
decisions about how to define a household. 
We examine two types of research questions where inference is apt to be affected by the 
structure of the household roster. Inequality measures depend on the assignment of individuals to 
households, and young adults are typically counted as full adults in the computation of adult 
equivalence. This means that their inclusion or exclusion in the household will affect 
measurement of inequality, especially when there are minimal economies of scale. 
Many young adults have younger siblings present within their parent's household. Many 
studies are interested in understanding sibling interactions, and thus the treatment of young 
adults in the household roster will have important implications for the analysis of sibling 
interactions. We document what appears to be sibling rivalry in households when we restrict our 
household definition to the narrowest feasible in our data. However, when we repeat the analysis 
using all siblings, rather than just siblings present, we find little support for sibling rivalry. In our 
data, there appears to be a correlation between nonagricultural income and the presence of 
female siblings that causes there to be a false relationship between female siblings and schooling. 
These two examples have been chosen as obvious places where the intermittent and 
permanent mobility of young adults are likely to be substantive for inference, but most research 
conditions on household composition. Hence, there are innumerable topics where limited 
information on all potential household members may be a source of bias. The easiest solution to 
these analytical problems is to collect more detailed rosters. In the Burkina Faso survey, data was 
collected on all individuals who have lived in the household over a three year period and all   25
children of the household head. With more detailed data, researchers can make their decisions 
about who is and who is not a household member, adapting this definition to match the 
appropriate research context. Concerns about double-counting and introducing biases into the 
computation of national statistics can easily be addressed in the same way, by imposing a 
definition of the household that minimizes this possibility. A broader roster will entail more data 
collection costs as it will take more time, but the analytical value of this additional information is 
likely to be large in most applications. Moreover, in places where there is not much mobility, 
where the issues raised herein are less substantive, the extra costs of the more detailed roster will 
also be minimal. Of course, a detailed household roster is not obviously the best way to collect 
information on migrants themselves when the purpose of the study is to study migrants as 
opposed to sampled households. When migrants are the study topic, a variety of other survey 
approaches are appropriate (Mistiaen and McKenzie 2007 is a review).   26
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Notes: Kernel density estimation of the fraction of household members present in 1998 that were 
not present in 2000 (moved out) for a given household. Data source: Burkina Child Fostering 
Survey (BCFS).   30
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Notes: Kernel density estimation of fraction of household members present in 2000 that were not 
present in 1998 (new entrants) for a given household. Data source: Burkina Child Fostering 
Survey (BCFS).   31
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Notes: Kernel density estimation of fraction of months during the previous three years that the 
individual spent outside the village. Data source: Burkina Child Fostering Survey (BCFS).   32
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Income with the Most Inclusive and Exclusive Definitions of 
Household Membership (Children Treated as Equivalent to Adults) 
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Notes: Lorenz curves graphing the cumulative share of total household agricultural income 
against the cumulative share of population. Children are treated equivalent to adults, β = 1. We 
assume the economies of scale parameter θ = 1. Data source: Burkina Child Fostering Survey 
(BCFS).   33
Figure 5: Distribution of Income with the Most Inclusive and Exclusive Definitions of 
Household Membership (Children Treated as 0.5 Adults) 
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Cumulative Share of Population
 
 
Notes: Lorenz curves graphing the cumulative share of total household agricultural income 
against the cumulative share of population. Children are treated as 0.5 adults, β = 0.5. We 
assume the economies of scale parameter θ = 1. Data source: Burkina Child Fostering Survey 
(BCFS).   34
Figure 6: Distribution of Income with the Most Inclusive and Exclusive Definitions of 
Household Membership (Children Treated as Equivalent to Adults,  
Economies of Scale Parameter =0.5) 
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Notes: Lorenz curves graphing the cumulative share of total household agricultural income 
against the cumulative share of population. Children are treated equivalent to adults, β = 1. We 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: All Individuals
Age 0‐7 1165 86.7 3.9 2.5 1.6 1.9 3.4
Age 8‐15 1170 78.0 6.5 3.9 3.1 3.9 4.6
Age 16‐24 737 48.7 9.6 9.9 8.4 12.1 11.3
Age 25‐49 956 79.3 6.9 4.0 2.3 3.3 4.2
Age 50+ 473 93.6 3.6 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.6
Panel B: Male
Age 0‐7 555 90.4 2.9 2.2 0.7 1.6 2.2
Age 8‐15 580 81.0 6.2 4.1 2.3 2.9 3.5
Age 16‐24 322 48.8 12.4 10.2 8.4 9.6 10.6
Age 25‐49 346 66.8 8.7 7.5 4.3 5.8 6.9
Age 50+ 224 92.0 4.0 1.3 0.5 0.9 1.3
Panel C: Female
Age 0‐7 610 83.4 4.8 2.8 2.3 2.1 4.6
Age 8‐15 590 75.1 6.8 3.7 3.9 4.7 5.8
Age 16‐24 415 48.7 7.5 9.6 8.4 14.0 11.8
Age 25‐49 610 86.4 5.9 2.0 1.1 2.0 2.6

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: All Individuals
Household Size 5.81 6.27 6.58 6.82 7.14 7.50 1.70 29.19
# individuals 0‐7 1.69 1.76 1.81 1.84 1.88 1.94 0.26 15.23
# individuals 8‐15 1.52 1.65 1.73 1.79 1.86 1.95 0.43 28.15
# individuals 16‐24 0.60 0.72 0.84 0.94 1.09 1.23 0.63 105.29
# individuals 25‐49 1.26 1.37 1.44 1.47 1.53 1.59 0.33 26.12
# individuals 50+ 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.05 6.77
Panel B: Male
Household Size 2.73 2.96 3.13 3.23 3.37 3.53 0.80 29.44
# individuals 0‐7 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.09 10.56
# individuals 8‐15 0.82 0.88 0.92 0.95 0.98 1.01 0.19 23.40
# individuals 16‐24 0.27 0.34 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.56 0.29 105.10
# individuals 25‐49 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.60 0.20 49.78
# individuals 50+ 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.03 8.74
Panel C: Female
Household Size 3.28 3.52 3.68 3.82 4.01 4.23 0.95 28.99
# individuals 0‐7 0.87 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.04 0.17 19.84
# individuals 8‐15 0.76 0.83 0.86 0.90 0.95 1.01 0.25 33.18
# individuals 16‐24 0.35 0.40 0.47 0.53 0.63 0.71 0.36 105.45
# individuals 25‐49 0.90 0.96 0.98 0.99 1.02 1.04 0.14 15.75
# individuals 50+ 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.02 5.06
Panel D: Household Characteristics
Total Dependency Ratio 155.14 151.80 149.24 145.19 139.61 134.74 ‐20.40 ‐13.15
Child Dependency Ratio 141.43 138.77 136.40 133.07 128.11 124.96 ‐16.47 ‐11.64
Total household per capita income 23726 21262 19429 19197 18253 17307 ‐6418 ‐27.05
Total household per capita 
agricultural income 14175 12395 11392 11005 10472 9952 ‐4223 ‐29.79
Total household per capita non‐























Age 0‐7 ‐0.286*** ‐0.149*** ‐0.068*** ‐13.885***
[0.024] [0.015] [0.018] [1.617]
Age 8‐15 ‐0.235*** ‐0.107*** ‐0.092*** ‐12.517***
[0.028] [0.016] [0.022] [1.678]
Age 25‐49 ‐0.264*** ‐0.093*** ‐0.108*** ‐12.618***
[0.034] [0.020] [0.024] [1.964]
Age 50+ ‐0.413*** ‐0.105*** ‐0.248*** ‐18.954***
[0.040] [0.020] [0.029] [2.640]
Marital Status
Widowed, Divorced ‐0.276*** ‐0.158*** ‐0.103*** ‐17.625***
[0.025] [0.017] [0.030] [1.368]
Never Married ‐0.229*** ‐0.227*** 0.028 ‐15.073***
[0.042] [0.027] [0.024] [2.685]
Occupation
Non‐agricultural occupation 0.290*** 0.181*** 0.068 16.265***
[0.037] [0.030] [0.051] [2.638]
Education
Highest Education Level is Primary 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.448
[0.018] [0.012] [0.016] [0.995]
Highest Education Level is Secondary 0.160** ‐0.090*** 0.194*** 10.061**
[0.068] [0.023] [0.053] [3.864]
Relationship to Head
Wife ‐0.274*** ‐0.342*** 0.124*** ‐19.204***
[0.038] [0.029] [0.031] [2.400]
Head of Household ‐0.090** ‐0.270*** 0.233*** ‐10.444***
[0.035] [0.021] [0.032] [2.562]
Other Relationship to Head 0.192*** ‐0.077*** 0.287*** 9.690***
[0.035] [0.008] [0.029] [1.612]
Gender
Male ‐0.052*** ‐0.035*** ‐0.013 ‐3.453***
[0.013] [0.006] [0.010] [0.762]








































Age 0‐7 ‐0.315*** ‐0.120*** ‐0.114*** ‐14.049*** ‐0.160*** ‐0.138*** 0.025 ‐9.046**
[0.031] [0.017] [0.019] [1.345] [0.045] [0.031] [0.035] [3.356]
Age 8‐15 ‐0.261*** ‐0.098*** ‐0.110*** ‐12.434*** ‐0.115** ‐0.082*** ‐0.022 ‐8.216**
[0.026] [0.019] [0.021] [1.644] [0.042] [0.026] [0.037] [2.785]
Age 25‐49 ‐0.086 ‐0.016 0.059 2.244 ‐0.320*** ‐0.093*** ‐0.186*** ‐16.738***
[0.076] [0.043] [0.063] [3.790] [0.040] [0.017] [0.037] [2.737]
Age 50+ ‐0.269*** ‐0.006 ‐0.136** ‐4.67 ‐0.421*** ‐0.101*** ‐0.283*** ‐21.076***
[0.063] [0.038] [0.053] [3.686] [0.045] [0.018] [0.033] [2.860]
Marital Status
Widowed, Divorced ‐0.296*** ‐0.087** ‐0.179*** ‐14.430*** ‐0.365*** ‐0.267*** ‐0.083* ‐26.892***
[0.059] [0.034] [0.034] [3.942] [0.065] [0.050] [0.047] [4.330]
Never Married ‐0.054 ‐0.095 0.079 ‐5.856 ‐0.407*** ‐0.317*** ‐0.038 ‐23.868***
[0.085] [0.054] [0.058] [6.149] [0.038] [0.032] [0.025] [2.991]
Occupation
Non‐agricultural 
occupation 0.301*** 0.238*** ‐0.0003 15.938*** 0.202* 0.042 0.174 13.498**
[0.027] [0.043] [0.041] [1.946] [0.101] [0.043] [0.100] [5.508]
Education
Highest Education Level is 
Primary 0.01 0.009 ‐0.014 0.044 ‐0.001 ‐0.013 0.027 1.086
[0.028] [0.014] [0.021] [1.216] [0.037] [0.018] [0.034] [1.863]
Highest Education Level is 
Secondary 0.072 ‐0.079** 0.093 4.74 0.338*** ‐0.076*** 0.350*** 19.969***
[0.083] [0.036] [0.089] [4.858] [0.080] [0.025] [0.060] [5.992]
Relationship to Head
Wife ‐0.297*** ‐0.410*** 0.192*** ‐19.978***
[0.044] [0.043] [0.045] [2.987]
Head of Household ‐0.104 ‐0.215*** 0.117** ‐16.650*** 0.062 ‐0.131*** 0.271*** 6.959*
[0.069] [0.050] [0.047] [5.572] [0.064] [0.027] [0.067] [3.747]
Other Relationship to 
Head 0.199*** ‐0.032** 0.219*** 7.922*** 0.198*** ‐0.093*** 0.335*** 12.883***
[0.034] [0.014] [0.038] [1.587] [0.052] [0.016] [0.041] [3.156]






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes No No No No No No
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No No No No No Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel A: All Children
# Siblings ‐0.022** ‐0.020** ‐0.009 ‐0.012 ‐0.007 ‐0.010 ‐0.012 ‐0.013
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008]
# Female Siblings 0.021 0.023* 0.010 0.017 0.001 0.008 0.007 0.012
[0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.011] [0.015] [0.011] [0.014] [0.011]
Panel B:  Boys
# Siblings ‐0.029** ‐0.032*** ‐0.008 ‐0.015* ‐0.006 ‐0.014 ‐0.014 ‐0.019*
[0.011] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009]
# Female Siblings 0.039** 0.042** 0.012 0.023 0.003 0.015 0.015 0.022
[0.019] [0.019] [0.015] [0.014] [0.018] [0.016] [0.017] [0.018]
Panel C: Girls
# Siblings ‐0.013 ‐0.007 ‐0.008 ‐0.009 ‐0.006 ‐0.005 ‐0.007 ‐0.005
[0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.014] [0.012]
# Female Siblings 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.012 ‐0.006 0.001 ‐0.006 ‐0.002





















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Non‐Agricultural Income 0.196* 0.207* 0.129 0.136
[0.112] [0.114] [0.083] [0.098]
Number of Female Siblings 0.657*** 0.681*** 0.685*** 0.742***
[0.058] [0.052] [0.084] [0.079]
Number of Biological Siblings ‐0.062 ‐0.073* ‐0.093 ‐0.123**
[0.042] [0.035] [0.062] [0.053]
Age and Gender Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No Yes
# Siblings ‐0.015 ‐0.015 ‐0.021* ‐0.026**
[0.011] [0.010] [0.012] [0.011]
# Female Siblings 0.013 0.015 0.028 0.033
[0.015] [0.015] [0.021] [0.022]
Household Non‐Agricultural Income 0.019 ‐0.003 0.026 0.002
[0.013] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021]
Number of Children 746 746 390 390
Boys Only
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for village clustering in brackets. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Dependent variable is current school enrollment 
status of the child
Age & Gender Fixed Effects
Village Fixed Effects
Siblings limited to living children
Siblings limited to age under 25
Sample limited to resident children
Siblings limited to resident children
All Children
41